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 Guest Essay
GDP NOW MATTERS MORE THAN FORCE
Leslie H. Gelb
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November/December 2010. Copyright 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Most nations today beat their foreign policy drums large-ly to economic rhythms, but less so the United States. Most nations define their interests largely in economic 
terms and deal mostly in economic power, but less so the United 
States. Washington still thinks of its security mainly in traditional 
military terms and responds to threats mainly with force. The prin-
cipal challenge for Washington, then, is to recompose its foreign 
policy with an economic theme, while countering threats in new 
and creative ways. The goal is to redefine “security” to harmonize 
with twenty-first-century realities. 
Economics is now the principal coin of the international 
realm, and gross domestic product now matters more than mili-
tary might. Any doubts about that should be erased by one simple 
and overwhelming fact: China is the first global power in world 
history that is not a global military power. China’s military punch 
will be restricted to its border areas for years. Most nations worry 
not about Chinese arms, but about its trade and investment deci-
sions. And though China’s GDP is just a little more than half of 
America’s, Beijing’s power rivals Washington’s. World leaders see 
China’s economy going up and America’s going down, largely be-
cause of Washington’s political incapacity to make hard decisions 
about its domestic economy.
Emerging powers today are seen as emerging precisely be-
cause of their growing economies, not their muscled up armies. 
Brazil, India, Turkey, and Indonesia are prime examples. Their key 
preoccupations are not military attacks on their soil, but loss of 
domestic support due to deteriorating economies. What they care 
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most about is attracting investments, expanding trade, improving 
education, and managing other internal matters that affect global 
competitiveness. The White House pays attention to these issues, 
to be sure, but mostly worries about wars and threats. 
The world is not safe, and because of terrorists and WMD, 
arguably less safe than ever. But in one critical respect, it is safer—
the prospect of wars among major powers. Today, the likelihood of 
armed conflict between great powers is far less than at any point in 
modern history. It is hard to imagine an arena in which their vital 
interests seriously clash. To be sure, great powers such as China 
and Russia will tussle with America and others for advantages, 
but they will stop well short of direct confrontation. They need 
one another to grow their economies. Given the receding threat 
of great-power wars, most world leaders have elevated economic 
priorities as never before. To be sure, leaders throughout history 
pursued economic strength as the foundation of state power, but 
power itself was equated with military might. Today, the prevailing 
idea is that economic strength should be applied primarily toward 
achieving economic—not military—ends.   
Yet, for all these novel characteristics of the present era, there 
is one stunning constant: the national security strategy of the 
United States. Whereas other countries have adjusted to the new 
economics-based order, Washington has been tardy, even obtuse.
It’s not as if Americans have to go out and invent a basic strat-
egy for this new era; Washington has one staring it in the face—the 
approach taken by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower during the 
early Cold War. Its underlying principles were to make the Ameri-
can economy the top priority by holding back on military spending 
and military interventions; to strengthen the economies of key al-
lies, especially in Western Europe and Japan, to lessen their vul-
nerability to Soviet pressure and increase common allied power; 
and to fend off threats by means of containment, deterrence, and 
military and economic aid plus military training.  The key was to 
help others fight for themselves.
Their strategy today would almost certainly revolutionize ba-
sic policy. For example, it would elevate Mexico far above Afghani-
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stan as a national priority. The fact is that Mexico could damage or 
help the United States profoundly and inescapably—just consider 
illegal immigration, drugs, crime, as well as the trade and invest-
ment potential. By contrast, even victory in Afghanistan would 
leave terrorists threats rampant elsewhere. 
Today, Truman and Eisenhower would focus on building 
situations of strength with key allies and forming ad-hoc coalitions 
with emerging powers. It is worth remembering that Truman did 
not intervene with U.S. troops in Greece and Turkey to implement 
his new containment doctrine; he gave them military and economic 
aid along with rhetorically strong but not open-ended promises. It 
is worth noting that Eisenhower quickly stopped the bloodshed in 
Korea with a truce.  
Without doubt, U.S. presidents need to preserve America’s 
core role as the world’s military and diplomatic balancer and pro-
tector—for its own sake and also because it adds to U.S. power in 
economic transactions. But economics has to be the main driver for 
current policy. Washington can gain much more political bang for 
its still considerable economic buck if American leaders put eco-
nomics at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But that is not enough.
To truly restore and advance U.S. international power, Amer-
ica’s economy has to be revitalized. That will take hard and risky 
political decisions and time. American leaders forever swear their 
allegiance to making these tough choices, but they never deliver. 
Meanwhile, Americans of nearly every political stripe wait and 
wonder whether their leaders will let the nation that saved the 
world in the twentieth century sink into history in the twenty-first.
